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Abstract: In Asian countries, contracting out public services to Non-
Governmental Organization (NGO) has been recognized as usual practice 
to support government function. This study found that their contractual 
agreement with the government strikes the nature of NGO as self-governing 
institutions, non-profit orientation, and independency. 
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Introduction 
 
The term of “Non-Governmental Organization” or generally abbreviated as 
NGO has been firstly recognized as universal designation for private and 
independent organizations working for non-profit outcomes since the 
enactment of the United Nations Charter 1945.1 Up to present, the works of 
NGO are diverse in many areas not only limited with their involvement in 
the United Nation’s forum. They even play an essential role in social and 
economic development of a state. 
Activities of NGO must be independent from any government’s influence. 
They shall not work for political and commercial advantages. Yet, since 
there has no basic boundaries of their structure and role, many NGOs work 
to carry out government functions and it has been practiced in some Asian 
countries like China, Pakistan, Cambodia, and Indonesia. Unfortunately, 
contracting out certain public services to NGO challenge their nature as 
independent organization.  
 
1. Relationship between Government and NGO 
(Practice in Asian Countries) 
 
The nature of NGO activities is basically neither operating by government 
nor driven by profit goals. With this characteristics, most scholars agree to 
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personalized them as ‘the agent of development’2 to fix the problems that 
have befallen the development process (Edwards & Hulme (eds.), 1996, 3.). 
Because of refusing government influence (Fisher, 1997), NGOs have 
distinct mind sets and attitudes that lead them to be more flexible in tackling 
multi sector issues of development with the grass-root movement or even 
direct actions that have an impact upon government policy-making. Their 
voice which usually speaking out against the government policy also have 
legitimacy in the eyes of public. Public legitimacy, the greater source of 
NGOs spirit to survive, naturally exists from their pure mission to stand up 
with public interests. 
In the developing world, NGOs are also often in partnership along with the 
government working to increase development through different channels 
and activities. Their opposing position against deviate policy of the 
government indeed reflects the balancing effort for true democracy. 
However, in certain circumstances NGO substitutes state presence in 
protecting social rights and other vulnerable segments such as reducing 
carbon emission, protecting wild animal, peace building mission, and etc. A 
good cooperation between NGOs and government is potential motivation to 
increase the development of state while the NGOs fill the gap on the 
government’s failure to target major societal problems. 
Generally, a state has obligation to provide public services to the society but 
sometimes their services could not reach effectively to the society because 
of common bureaucracy obstacles (such as less productivity, financial 
constraint (inefficient), and lack of qualified governance). This study found 
that in some Asian countries, contracting out public services to NGO has 
been practiced as preferential tool to reach the public sector objectives. In 
Pakistan, the lack of government capability to provide healthcare services is 
the leading ground of the government to outsource the administration of 
primary health care services to NGOs. The contracted NGOs to carry out 
public health care services in the district of Rahim Yar Khan demonstrate 
their ability to improve the utilization of the existing Basic Health Units 
(BHU), physical conditions, availability of drugs, and staff punctuality 
(World Bank, 2006; Tanzil – Zahidie – Ahsan – Kazi – Shaikh, 2014, 277.). 
Since 1990 contracting out social services to NGOs has been carried out by 
local governments in China mostly in urban areas (Shanghai, Beijing, 
Guangzhou, and Shenzhen) (Xijin & Ming, 2009, 6.). The Purchase of Service 
Contracting (扩大购买服务 - kuodagoumaifuwu) has been increasingly 
applied to meet demands of public services including education, public 
health, elderly services, handicapped services, community services, 
employment, city planning, as well as cultural activities (Chan, 2015, 10.; 
Teets, 2012, 17-20.) that shifting the role of the government in public services 
from being a direct provider to a public resources coordinator. For instance, 
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in Shanghai, NGOs are performing as the operator of socialized elder care 
affairs and the performer of community elder server while at the same time 
the local government is acting as policy maker, service designer, public 
financial supporter, and public elder services buyer (Yu, 2014, 156.). 
Having position as the poorest and least healthy countries in Southeast Asia 
(Jacobs & Price, 2006, 27-39.; Levine & Gardner, 2008, 1.), to increase the 
access of affordable health care starting 1998 Cambodia tendered 
management of government health services to NGOs (Deolalikar – 
ShikhaJha – Quising, 2015, 170.). Moreover, funded by the Asian 
Development Bank and the World Bank, Cambodia established a pilot 
policy ‘Contracting of Health Service Project’ undertaken between 1999 to 
2003 to provide district health services in selected districts that 
encompassed 1.26 million populations (Bhushan – Keller – Schwartz, 2002, 
1-3.). A study conducted by Jarrah (2008) found health centres that 
contracted out by NGOs were achieved a higher percentage of the 
catchment population’s need. In addition, she also argued that contracted 
health centres, whether located in rural or urban areas, performed better than 
the non-contracted government facilities.  
 
2. Dilemmas in Contracting Out Public Services to NGOs 
 
As previously discussed, we do understand that contracting out public 
services to NGO provides greater advantages and effective achievements.3 
However, tendering public services to NGOs through a contractual 
agreement will result legal dilemmas that undermine the nature of NGO. 
This contractual agreement has no profit gain but in fact threatening their 
independency. In water service contract practices, for instance, NGO is 
under pressure with the contractual requirements. The pressure is on NGOs 
to become increasingly commercial in order to implement their contracts 
efficiently (Clayton, 1999, 20.).4 The position of NGO in doing such 
commercial activities would question their position as voluntary 
organization. The output of contracting out to deliver certain services to 
NGOs would make them prefer to reach quantitative requirements under the 
contract than the qualitative objectives of their mission to increase 
community development. 
It must be noted that Government Organized NGO (GONGO) in China is 
absolutely not independent (Beja, 2006, 53-74.) because they are formed by 
the government or Communist Party Organizations (Brothers, 2015, 53-74). 
The Chinese government also extend their control to NGOs created by 
individuals dissociate from government or party organization (Ma, 2002, 
113-130.). In practice the Government prefer to tender their public services 
to GONGO than the private NGO under the reason of easy to control their 
activities but a study (Chan, 2010, 301-306.; Kang & Heng, 2008, 50-55.) 
found that GONGO has lower control from the government than the other 
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kinds of NGO (see table 1 below). Though their activities are getting less 
control from the government, GONGO itself usually acknowledged as the 
puppet of the government that could be spared from ethical standards of 
bureaucracy just because to follow the order of the government.  
In general, the tight control over NGOs in China presumably endangers 
NGO work as independent organization. Particularly the high level control 
for certain NGOs working in sensitive areas will pressure them to limit their 
work (Schwartz, 2004, 40-45.) in accordance with the authoritarian 
government political goals. 
 
Table 1 
Graduated Control of NGOs in China [Wu, F. & Chan, K. M. (2012), 9-
17.] 
 
Business Nature Main Funding Sources Scale Level of Control 
Category I:  
service delivery 
Government, 
GONGO, official 
foundations 
Small NGO based 
in residential 
community 
Low 
Medium to large 
NGO, across 
communities 
Medium 
Category II:  
service, public 
outreach, and 
advocacy in non-
sensitive areas 
Domestic enterprises, 
domestic private 
foundations NGO and/or cross-regional network 
Low to Medium 
Foreign source of 
funding Medium to High 
Category III: 
advocacy in 
political/religious/ 
ethnic and/or other 
sensitive areas 
Private donations, 
international NGO, 
and foundations 
NGO, informal 
groups, and/or 
network 
High 
 
The successful experience of contracting out health care services to NGO in 
Cambodia and Pakistan also increased the public transaction cost to the 
government when compared to the direct public services. Understanding 
that staff motivation as the key challenge it needed to overcome, the NGO 
contractors applied additional salary and performance-based incentives for 
their staff (Bloom et. al., 2006, 11.). The government in fact must also 
allocate time to directly monitor the performance of contracted NGOs and 
ensure the delivery of public services in an efficient, effective, and fair 
manner. Thus, contracting generates higher cost and time consuming to the 
government which usually serve as huge burden for developing and least 
developed countries. 
Indonesian practice on government-NGO relationship seems reliable and 
closed to the ideal concept. Under the Indonesian law, NGO has an 
important place to support government role to provide public services to its 
citizens.5 Noting that contracting out such services will lead to higher cost 
and time consuming thus partnership between NGO and government 
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provider services work together under the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ 
(MoU) which is not legally binding between them but giving guidance the 
role and function of NGO in the service delivery. For instance, MoU 
between local health provider and MoU usually positioned NGO as the 
controlling party to supervise the delivery service not as the direct provider. 
In natural disaster or armed conflict situation, NGO has possibility to be 
contracted by the government to provide public services but only in short 
period to recover such crisis situation while the government has lack human 
and financial resources.6 
 
Conclusion 
 
Contracting out public services to NGO has been raised many critics in 
particular about their independency. This study found that even though in 
Pakistan and Cambodian practice of contracting generates advantages in 
certain areas but the cost of service delivery is higher than the direct service 
expenses. Additionally, NGO is under pressure under the public contract to 
become increasingly commercial in order to implement their contract 
efficiently.  
With contracting or not, the Chinese government has been established the 
tight control over the NGOs that presumably strikes NGOs work as 
independent organization. Preferring tender public services to GONGO, as 
commonly refer as the puppet of the government; keep them at the distance 
of democratic values. 
Indonesia has a distinct practice of contracting public services to NGO that 
only applied in crisis situation and short period of contracting. Though 
partnership between NGO and government guaranteed by the Indonesian 
law but the substance of contracting is not to make them to be service 
provider, merely as controller of service delivery. Aware with the cost of 
contracting, the Indonesian government prefer to enter into Memorandum of 
Understanding with NGOs, which creates certain guideline of functions but 
has no financial and legal obligation.  
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